ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
We find it clearly opposed to our national belief that innocent civilians should ever be subject to forcible relocation or slaughter because of their religious, ethnic, racial, or tribal heritage. Ethnic conflict can also threaten regional stability and may well give rise to potentially serious national security concerns. When this occurs, the intersection of our values and national interests make it imperative that we take action to prevent -and whenever possible stop -outbreaks of mass killing and displacement.
-National Security Strategy 2000
United States military forces are participating in an increasing number of small scale contingency (SSC) operations, many with no end in sight. Since the Gulf War, U.S. forces have conducted more than 50 SSCs requiring over 500 military personnel each, a 300% increase over the ten previous years.' This increase in missions, occurring simultaneously with declining resources, has stretched many military units and specialties near their breaking points.
Wherever the military deploys to quell conflict or mitigate humanitarian disaster, they find themselves operating side by side with civilian International Organizations (10). lOs can be further subdivided into Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO) and NonGovernmental
Organizations (NGO). These organizations share the same desire to relieve suffering and bring stability back to troubled regions. The parallel objectives suggest the possibility of working more closely together for mutual benefit. This paper explores methods for the military to cope with its force structure/mission mismatch. It begins by defining and describing the organizations involved, then identifies past challenges incurred in these operations. After outlining guidance from both national and international agencies, the paper shows how ail of these pieces can fit together to achieve unity of effort. It shows examples of successful joint ventures between military and civil organizations, then discusses the road ahead. The paper outlines solutions for more quickly achieving military endstate and reducing the adverse impact of these operations on the military, while simultaneously improving the effectiveness of lOs in general and NGOs in particular, and ensuring success in small scale contingency operations.
Small Scale Contingency (SSC)
Operations is a new term that replaces Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during and after war.
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THE OPERATIONS
The first challenge in working together is establishing a common language and understanding of the methods used by all players in approaching problems. This section defines some of the terms contained within U.S. joint doctrine. These definitions closely parallel those approved by the United Nations and accepted by both militaries and international organizations.
The majority of the operations United States forces participate in are either United Nations or United Nations authorized peace operations, with the majority of those having humanitarian dimensions or consequences.^ Since its inception, the UN has undertaken 54 peace operations, with 15 ongoing in April 2000.^
TYPES OF OPERATIONS
Peace operations are military supported operations that serve one or more of the five functions below. Of these, most are adaptations introduced in the 1990s. Prior UN peace operations consisted of traditional peacekeeping (defined below). In addition, humanitarian operations may require considerable military support and may be "stand-alone" or part of peace operations. The terms commonly used today to describe specific types of operations include;
Peace-making. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict.
Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.
Peace enforcement. Application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.
Peace-building. Post conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.
Preventive Diplomacy. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence.'* The need to provide humanitarian assistance to the affected populace is usually embedded within each of these types of operations. Providers of humanitarian assistance vary from operation to operation, based on situation, danger and need. NGOs clearly state their values, goals and purpose when they organize, with all recognized by their country of origin. They have flat structures and once organized, they tend to make decisions within their organizations by consensus rather than majority or plurality votes.
While this is a foreign concept to military leaders, their rationale that substantial dissent among humanitarian organizations prevents effective action is sound.*^ lOs receive funding in one of two ways, directly from sponsor countries or from private donations. IGOs primary funding comes from state sponsors while NGOs receive the majority of their money from private donations. Funding, of course, effects the mission, organization and decision making process of these organizations. While the amount of funding, and its effect on organizations is purely illustrative, it is always good to understand to whom the organization is accountable.
IGOs receive the majority of their funding from state budgets and therefore are dependent on member states for implementation of decisions. NGOs tend to receive funding on voluntary rather than obligatory basis, negating the need for consensus from above, but maintaining the need for consensus from within. However, some receive funds from and become implementing partners with states or IGOs. When this occurs, the NGO operates under constraints not normally familiar to them. For both types of organizations, public and media attention are key.
Once a need receives international attention, states and private citizens get involved. The public attention usually prompts adequate resources and donations for these operations, while similar but less known tragedies go under-funded.*^ Situations with the greatest media visibility attract NGOs because of the positive effect on the NGOs ability to raise funds. Staying engaged militarily provides many long term benefits for our country. While the presence of our military doesn't eliminate the requirements for our other elements of national 7 power, such as diplomatic, economic or informational, it clearly shows our resolve in democratic, security and prosperity issues.
While the military can get the job done, it must be selective as to when and where to use it. By focusing on both threats and opportunities that are most closely aligned to national interests the U.S. can more carefully assess the size and duration of each mission, ensuring wise use of soldiers.
All military operations are a projection of our political will and our national interests.
Knowing that our country can t do it all, our military and political leaders determine where and when to enforce our will through a hierarchical system of interests and values. Peace operations, as a sub-set of small scale contingencies, are analyzed against our three levels of Interests, followed by three categories of SSCs. elements for each unit actually deployed is insufficient. Generally four or five of an asset or unit is necessary to sustain each element committed for a long duration.^'* Additionally, the Army is designed to deploy and operate as divisions and corps. Tailored force packages, usually at the brigade level, deploy on these operations. These packages receive "slices" of all of the combat support and combat service support enablers, many of which are not designed to be "sliced" down to that level. When the next rotation comes there are insufficient "slices" to go around and the LD/HD equation comes back into play. The DOD is currently undergoing its largest transformation in recent history. The numerous transformation studies will bring change to our current structure, but only time will tell if the DOD will be able to fund and field sufficient enablers to fill the LD/HD gaps. The magnitude of the current strategy-resources mismatch and the damage it can cause over time if not addressed, demands that the we increase the level of resources devoted to defense. We can increase resources by taking advantage of potential economies of scale to reduce costs while maintaining acceptable levels of risk, or change the defense strategy to reduce the demands being placed on the armed forces.^^ • Don't execute missions unless peacekeepers are able to defend themselves and the peace accord.
• Bedrock principles of peacekeeping remain consent of the parties, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense.
• Ensure resolutions are consistent with human rights standards and have practical specified tasks and timelines.
• Ensure resolutions delineate a clear chain of command and unity of effort.
• Plan for deployment of forces to a traditional peacekeeping operation in 30 days, 90 days for complex peace operations.
• Set minimum requirements for unit capabilities and training.
• UN must develop an analysis mechanism to distinguish where peacekeeping can succeed and where it will become an impossible mission.
The bottom line focus coming from policy makers can be summed up in a few points.
• Don't commit to operations without a clear mission, endstate, and expectation of success. Ensure the force is appropriately tailored for the mission.
• Use military coalitions to build world consensus and reduce committed U.S. forces.
• Form coalitions with both government agencies and NGOs to achieve desired endstate and decrease time necessary for complete military disengagement.
The next section provides guidance and a litmus test on what our national leaders should consider when choosing to use the military.
WHEN TO USE THE MILITARY
It is indisputsbis that since the end of the cold war there has been a dramatic increase in the United Nations activities related to the maintenance of peace and security. The end of the cold war removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere.
-Boutros Boutros-Ghali^'
So what is the appropriate use of our military short of major war? How should we involve U.S. military in SSCs and peace operations? What guidelines should we use to make these decisions?
The administration determines both the number of operations and the ends they expect to achieve upon mission completion. In a broad sense, they also set the ways to achieve those objectives through policy and directives. Governmental departments must adjust their methods of planning and execution within the parameters of policy to reduce friction and increase capability to conduct operations. By more efficiently managing currently available means to conduct operations, while simultaneously finding innovative ways to increase the resource pool, the United States will better meet its objectives.
The National Security Strategy (NSS) clearly identifies the need to carefully manage engagement activities to prevent erosion of current and long term military readiness for large scale contingencies.^* Additionally, the NSS defines questions to consider prior to committing military force which include clearly defined mission and endstate.^^ Strictly adhering to these parameters would reduce the number and duration of SSC's.
We are more Inclined to act where our interests and values are both at stake and where our resources will affect tangible improvement, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, in each of these instances, atrocities against and the expulsion of people in the heart of Europe undermined the very values over which we had fought two World Wars and the Cold War. Left unchecked, the problem could have spread elsewhere throughout Europe. The migrations of refugees could destabilize surrounding countries and harm the NATO alliance. NATO success in these operations was also considered vital for the future of the organization. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, we saw our interests affected to a sufficient degree to warrant military intervention."**^
The decision to employ military forces to support humanitarian interests focuses more on the military's unique capabilities and resources rather than on its combat power. Generally, combat forces quickly create a safe and secure environment and pave the way for the follow-on force and the rest of the military capabilities key to soiving humanitarian concerns. These 12 capabilities are wide ranging, including: strategic lift of relief supplies, water purification, and in¬ country mobility.
The government normally decides to use the military only when the scale of a humanitarian catastrophe exceeds the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond; the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to provide an immediate response; the military is needed to establish the preconditions necessary for effective application of other instruments of national power; humanitarian crisis could affect U.S. combat operations; or when a response requires unique military resources. Such efforts by the U.S., preferably in conjunction with other members of the international community, are limited in duration, have a clearly defined mission and end state, entail minimal risk to U.S. lives, and are designed to give the affected country the opportunity to restore its own basic services.'^'
But before we commit forces, we should first answer some basic questions outlined in our National Security Strategy:
1. Have we explored or exhausted non-military means that offer a reasonable chance of achieving our goals?
2. Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission?
What is the threat environment and what risks will our forces have?
4. What level of effort will be needed to achieve our goals?
5. What is the potential cost -human and financial -of the operation?
6. What is the opportunity cost in terms of maintaining our capability to respond to higher priority contingencies?
7. Do we have milestones and a desired endstate to guide a decision on terminating the mission?
8. Is there an interagency or multinational political-military plan to ensure that hard-won achievements are sustained and continued in the mission area after the withdrawal of U.S.
forces?
Additionally, we should ask if there are other resources, national or international, capable of augmenting employment of military assets.
With the players, challenges, and guidance identified, the next section starts to pull the pieces together and shows how we can create unity of effort.
PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT
So how do we facilitate the process of getting all parties working together towards a common goal? We can gain the most for our military by concentrating on better working Another area to understand is the cultural difference in the military and NGOs. The military and lOs have contrasting cultures which create barriers that must be breached early on.
However, with knowledge of each others strengths and weaknesses and operational practices, these two groups can learn to complement each other. A comparison of the cultural norms, both real and perceived, highlight the starting point for this working relationship.'^'
Recognizing the need to establish common support mechanisms InterAction, a membership body for major American relief and development NGOs, sponsored a membership conference. The conferees determined in an age of declining aid and increasing humanitarian operations, they must coordinate better or get left behind. They understood that the NGOs that There are about fifty key NGOs we repeatedly see on Peace Operations. Some, at considerable sacrifice, contribute personnel to advise or role-play in major military exercises and participate in key military sponsored conferences. Educating ourselves, while working together before deployments, improves our ability to work well together in the mission area.
Analyzing which NGOs habitually work in a unit's area of responsibility (AOR), and which ones accept government funding provides a good indicator of which organizations will be there in the future. -SOMALIA 1992 -SOMALIA -1993 Somalia experienced a nation-wide man-made famine complicated by bloody inter-clan battles. Clans and profit seekers confiscated critical donated food supplies immediately after they arrived in country, using this food as a source of power and corruption. NGOs considered 50% food losses acceptable, as they hired mercenaries for protection. When U.S. military forces entered the country under UN mandate, 4 million people lived in famine areas with 330,000 facing imminent death.^^ The U.S. military forces provided security, opened supply lines, and assisted NGOs in getting relief supplies to where they were needed. These efforts saved over 110,000 lives.
While the U.S. Task Force was successful, the transition to UN Forces in Somalia (UNISOM II) was not. UNISOM II had command and control and security difficulties leading to continued problems in and around Mogadishu. U.S. forces withdrew as U.N. forces assumed control of the operations. Unfortunately, the relief efforts began to fail, forcing the U.S. to send forces back to Somalia.
OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE -RWANDA -1994
The massacre of over 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda between April and June 1994 created a refugee crisis causing the U.S. to provide soldiers to assist the UN relief effort. Only 3,600 soldiers provided logistics support and a security umbrella for a large number of NGOs. When the military arrived, there were over 800,000 refugees in Goma, Zaire and 1,100 were dying every day.^^ Within 60 days, NGO water purification facilities replaced U.S. military water purification units and food and medical supplies reached refugee camps. The U.S. military established various metrics as measures of success. As they continued to improve living conditions in the refugee camps, they saw death rates return to normal levels for the population. Thirty days later, U.S. soldiers redeployed.
These operations are just a sampling in a growing list of successful cooperative efforts between the military and NGOs. Reading the after action reviews by both civilian and military organizations reveals one common belief in the reason for success, the Civil Military Operations
Center (CMOC). For military members, the name CMOC implies a coordinated operations effort with one person in charge. For members of the NGOs, CMOC is more of a discussion area where they can exchange ideas, rather than a coordination area. For all concerned, the CMOC means communications. It is the conduit for the exchange of ideas and the single string that ties the humanitarian effort together.
The next section provides recommendations for the military to adjust or focus current procedures to increase mission capabilities and success while reducing committed forces.
THE ROAD AHEAD
No amount of peacekeeping and peacebuilding capabilities will make up for the absence of an overall strategy and the underlying consensus on the objectives and the proper ways with which to deal with the challenges. If not embedded in a broader strategy of nationbuilding, military peacekeeping will fail either in theater as a military operation or as part of the broader strategy when the conflict resumes as soon as the peacekeepers have been withdrawn.
-Robert Dorfl®^
Reducing the number of missions or the duration of missions are two actions the administration could take to alleviate the force structure mismatch, but neither is likely to occur.
This section discusses recommendations to change the long-term methodology in which we approach peace operations, then outlines five key elements of success for tackling specific missions.
The previously identified guidance and recommendations offered by several government agencies clearly identify a recognized need to change our current methods of operations.
These recommendations support the premise that the military cannot and should not try to accomplish everything on their own. Two recommendations to reduce the military workload are to increase available resources and adjust procedures used to accomplish their missions.
We can multiply available resources by forming better coalitions with lOs, military partners, and the host government to perform non-military tasks currently performed by our military units. We can stop duplication of effort by analyzing missions and goals of these organizations and determining where those goals can assist the national objective. By assisting these organizations, where practicable, in moving to and establishing operations within the area, we complete both military and 10 missions more efficiently. Some organizations will opt to remain completely independent, while others will realize that accepting logistics support will speed their timeliness of supporting needy people, decrease time needed to conduct operations, and increase the amount of funding available to accomplish their goals.
Adjusting procedures simply means re-looking methods of both unit replacement and rotation before turning to any force re-structuring plans. We must break from the mindset that all units entering an area of operations must be replaced. Some organizations like civil affairs, construction, and water purification can move in, accomplish specific tasks, and then draw down either completely or to a level of managing established programs. Additionally, adjusting or extending unit rotations will create significantly less turmoil by reducing the number of personnel affected and easing workload on transition centers. environment. This is the basic concept used for many current operations, however, the HOM often lacks the power and authority to back up his or her edicts-this must be rectified.
Additionally, these operations normally continue long after the military goes home. Civilian control allows for continuity of command and eases coalition building with NGOs.
Third, for success in humanitarian operations, the military must change its cultural mindset that the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) is the primary focus. In these operations, the CMOC is the main effort and the TOC, while critical to the security of all involved, is the supporting effort. In most future operations, the UN will establish a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)
to serve as the lead agent for information exchange, coordination and deconfliction between the UN operations, military forces and lOs. In this case, the CMOC would become a component of the HOC. Assignment of some of the best and brightest to the CMOC or HOC must accompany this changing mindset. While this concept is easy to propose, it is difficult to find all of the right people given the personnel constraints previously discussed.
Fourth, the military must understand the humanitarian perspective. There are several aspects to this understanding. Part of this includes a basic awareness of local culture which the military has become quite proficient in over the past few years. But also included is the understanding of both the nations involved and the NGOs with their needs and objectives. The CMOC is an excellent conduit for exchange of cultural norms and concerns between all affected parties.
Finally, the military commander must appoint a respected member of the relief community to serve as his Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD). The HUMAD operates in much the same way as the Political Advisor (POLAD), serving as a respected expert in the field and advising the commander on critical aspects of the humanitarian mission. This advisor would also recommend which key lOs the military should assign liaisons with, and which events where the military and lOs should stand together in solidarity. The HUMAD would also be able to advise the commander when and when not to praise the 10 efforts in public and media forums, thus giving them more legitimacy and support both at home and abroad.
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There are no easy solutions to our military force structure mismatch. There are however, practical methods available to our leaders to accomplish current missions while easing the workload for several severely overtaxed units. Building coalitions with organizations wishing to remain independent, deploying units for longer periods of time, and understanding the operation from the NGO perspective are difficult in the short term. However, the long term gains from these actions will benefit our soldiers, our nation, and those nations we are trying to protect.
CONCLUSION
The only reason Operation Provide Comfort worked so well was because it was all done without a piece of paper being signed; the situation grew up so quickly that it outstripped the government's ability to be bureaucratic.
-Major General James Jones
The complexity of peace operations is long recognized within both the U.S. government and the military. The White House and the Departments of State and Defense published directives, strategic plans and doctrine defining how to conduct these operations. However, the high levels of force commitment in these operations and other small scale contingencies, continues to erode the combat capabilities of the forces we rely on to defend our nation in war.^"* To reduce friction produced through conduct of robust levels of SSCs while striving to maintain high levels of readiness for war, we must either reduce the number or duration of operations, or find innovative ways to increase the availability of forces.^^ The administration and military, working in concert and following published guidance, can reduce the friction and increase readiness.
The sons and daughters of the United States of America receive praise and respect wherever they deploy to alleviate world problems. They are always up to the task and never have, and never will, let our country down. We owe it to these great Americans to train and build our organizations for peace operations, using the most efficient methods available. Only then, can our country's leaders say we are doing as much for our service members as they are doing for America.
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